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ABSTRACT
While there exist many isolation mechanisms that are available
to cloud service providers, including virtual machines, containers,
etc. , the problem of side-channel increases in importance as a re-
maining security vulnerability – particularly in the presence of
shared caches and multicore processors. In this paper we present
a hardware-software mechanism that improves the isolation of
cloud processes in the presence of shared caches on multicore
chips. Combining the Intel CAT architecture that enables cache
partitioning on the ￿y with novel scheduling techniques and state
cleansing mechanisms, we enable cache-side-channel free comput-
ing for Linux-based containers and virtual machines, in particular,
those managed by KVM. We do a preliminary evaluation of our
system using a CPU bound workload. Our system allows Simultane-
ous Multithreading (SMT) to remain enabled and does not require
application level changes.
KEYWORDS
cache, side-channels, scheduling, hardware partitioning, cloud com-
puting
1 INTRODUCTION
Cache-based side-channel attacks (e.g., [13, 26, 27]) are a threat
to computing environments where a diverse set of users share
hardware resources. Such attacks take advantage of observable
side-e￿ects (on hardware) due to the execution of software pro-
grams. A number of these attacks focus on di￿erences in timing
while accessing shared processor caches. Recently, researchers have
adapted these cache-based side-channel attacks to cloud computing
environments, especially Infrastructure-as-a-Service (IaaS) clouds
(e.g., [18, 23, 30, 47]), and showed that secrets and sensitive infor-
mation can be extracted across co-located virtual machines (VMs).
Container frameworks such as Docker[7] that virtualize the oper-
ating system are even more susceptible to such attacks since they
share the underlying operating system (e.g., [48]).
Initial cache-based side-channel attacks focused on schedulers,
either at the OS level or Virtual Machine Monitor (VMM) layer [13,
26, 47]. Other approaches also focused on resource sharing – e.g.,
using the processor core (for instance SMT on a single core) to
access shared L1 and L2 caches [27]. Recent attacks have focused
on the Last-Level-Cache (LLC) that is shared across multiple cores
[18, 23, 43, 44, 48] – these make defenses much harder.
Many defenses against cache-side-channel attacks in cloud envi-
ronments have also been proposed (e.g., [6, 19, 21, 22, 24, 25, 28, 31,
32, 37–40, 45, 51]). However, the proposed solutions su￿er from a
variety of drawbacks: (a) some are probabilistic [25, 37, 51]; (b) oth-
ers do not protect applications when SMT is enabled [51]; (c) some
require developers to re-write applications [19, 22, 31], (d) while
others require hardware changes [39, 40] impacting deployability;
(e) some depend on violating x86 semantics by modifying the reso-
lution, accuracy or availability of timing instructions [21, 24, 38]
and consequently require signi￿cant changes to the applications.
Compiler-based [6] and page coloring based cache-partitioning
[28, 32, 45] approaches have high overheads making them imprac-
tical.
Defenses against cache-side-channel attacks that eliminate the
attacks, rather than frustrate techniques employed by the attacker
are desirable. Shannon’s noisy-channel coding theorem states that
information can be transmitted, regardless of the amount of noise on
the channel. Probabilistic defenses (e.g., [25, 37, 51]) may decrease
the bit-rate of attacks, but cannot fully eliminate them. In addition
to a guaranteed defense, the solution must not severely impact (i)
the performance of the applications or (ii) utilization of the machine.
In other words, defenses must minimize the performance impact of
enforcing hard isolation to remain practical. For instance, disabling
hyper-threading [51], which many existing solutions do, can have
a signi￿cant performance impact on the applications. To the best
of our knowledge, every cloud provider enables hyperthreading.
Furthermore, the solutionsmust be easy to adopt. History has shown
that solutions requiring additional development time (or signi￿cant
changes to existing applications) have a harder time being adopted
(as shown in the Return Oriented Programming (ROP) community
[34]). Thus, solutions that require developers make application level
changes [19, 22] may be challenging to apply to existing workloads.
In this paper, we present a framework designed to eliminate
side-channel attacks in cloud computing systems that use multicore
processors with a shared LLC. The proposed framework uses a
combination of Commodity-o￿-the-Shelf (COTS) hardware features
alongwith novel scheduling techniques to eliminate cache-based side-
channel attacks. In particular, we use Cache Allocation Technology
(CAT) [17] that allows us to partition last-level caches at runtime.
CAT, coupled with state cleansing between context switches, and
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selective sharing of common libraries removes any possibility of
cache-timing-based side-channel attacks between di￿erent security
domains. We implement a novel scheduling method, as an extension
to the commonly-used Completely-Fair-Scheduler (CFS) in Linux, to
reduce the overheads inherent due to any such cleansing operation.
Our solution provides a transparent1 way to eliminate side-channel
attacks, while still working with hyperthreading enabled systems. It
works with containers, kernel-based virtual machines (KVMs) and
any other schedulable entity that relies on the OS scheduler2.
In summary, the proposed framework:
C1 Eliminates cache-based side-channel attacks for schedula-
ble units (e.g., containers, KVMs)
C2 Requires no application level changes
C3 Allows providers to exploit hyperthreading, and
C4 Imposes modest performance overheads
2 SYSTEM AND ATTACK MODEL
Figure 1: Hierarchical Cache in Modern Processors
2.1 System Model
We consider public Platform-as-a-Service (PaaS) or Infrastructure-
as-a-cloud (IaaS) cloud environments. Such environments allow
for co-residency of multiple computational appliances (e.g., con-
tainers, VMs) belonging to potentially di￿erent security domains.
We assume that the cloud computing infrastructure is built using
commodity-o￿-the-shelf (COTS) components. In particular, we as-
sume that the servers have multi-core processors with multiple
levels of caches, some of which are shared (See Figure 1). We also
assume that the servers have a runtime mechanism to partition the
last-level shared cache.
For this work, we evaluated our approach using an Intel Haswell
series processor that has a three-level cache hierarchy: private
level 1 (L1) and level 2 (L2) caches for each core (64KB and 256KB
respectively) and a last level (L3) cache (20MB) that is shared among
all the cores3. For cache partitioning, we turned to the Intel Cache
Allocation Technology (CAT)[17] that allows us to partition the
shared L3 cache. The CAT mechanism is con￿gured using model-
speci￿c registers (MSRs). This can be carried out at runtime in a
dynamic fashion using software mechanisms. On our processor
the maximum number of partitions is limited to four but newer
generations support more [16]. Intel CAT technology has been
available on select Haswell series processors starting late 2014 and
continues to be available on select processor lines belonging to
1From the perspective of the application developer/use
2For ease of exposition, in the rest of the paper, we will describe our framework using
containers.
3This is the model of the system that we use for the rest of this paper.
Broadwell and Skylake micro-architectures that succeeded Haswell
micro-architecture.
While our implementation and evaluation used an Intel Haswell
processor with Intel CAT technology the proposed approach is
generally applicable to any multi-core processor with a hierarchical
cache, shared last-level cache, and a mechanism to partition the
shared last-level cache.
2.2 Attack Model
While there are many potential threats to security in public cloud
environments (e.g., [5, 35]) the focus of this paper is on cache-based
side-channel attacks (e.g., [46, 48]). At a high-level, in cache-based
side-channel attacks an attacker deduces information about the
victim’s computations by observing the victims cache usage. The
information deduced can range from high-level information such
as which tenant you are co-located with (e.g., [30]) to more ￿ne
grained details such as cryptographic keys or items in a shopping
cart (e.g., [18, 48]).
In such attacks an attacker process ￿rst needs to co-locate (i.e.,
get assigned to the same physical server) itself with the target or vic-
tim in the infrastructure. Methods to both achieve co-residency [30]
and to thwart co-residency (e.g., [1, 14, 15, 25, 49]) have been
discussed in the literature. In this work we assume that an at-
tacker is able to co-locate with the victim and focus on thwart-
ing side-channel attacks themselves. Our framework complements
approaches that thwart co-residency.
There are primarily two techniques to exploit cache based side-
channels discussed in the literature, namely, ‘Prime+Probe” attacks
[27] and ‘Flush-Reload” attacks [13]. It is important to note that
while these techniques are popular, they are only possible because
of measurable interference. Our solution addresses these speci￿c
techniques and other techniques that leverage the cache as a side-
channel.
(a) “Prime+Probe” attacks [27]: At a high level, the attack
‘primes’ the entire cache with random data. After waiting for a cer-
tain time (so that the victim executes), the adversary then ‘probes’
the cache to see which of its own lines have been evicted – thus
providing information on which lines were used by the victim. This
information combined with the knowledge of cache access patterns
exhibited by victim programs (e.g., cryptographic algorithms) can
be used to extract information (e.g., cryptographic key being used)
about the victim.
(b) “Flush-Reload” attacks [13]: are a modi￿cation of prime-
and-probe attacks and leverage memory pages that are shared
between the attacker and the victim. This allows the attacker to
‘￿ush’ speci￿c lines rather than prime the whole cache. The rest
of the procedure is similar – waiting for a certain amount of time
to see which of the lines corresponding to shared memory pages
are in the cache (hence used by the victim). This method is more
e￿cient and results in less noise for the attacker.
We consider consider both cross-core (i.e., attacker and victim
running on di￿erent cores on the same processor) and same-core
(i.e., attacker and victim running on the same core) side-channel
attacks. Same-core attacks, as the name indicates, require the at-
tacker to achieve co-residency on the same core and be able to
preempt the victim. They typically focus on higher-level caches
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(L1 and L2) that are speci￿c to the core. Cross-core attacks on the
other hand only require the attacker to achieve co-residency on the
same physical server. Their limitation is that they only allow the
attacker to observe victim’s activities through the last level-cache
which is shared and thus is noisy. However, it has been shown that
such limitations can be overcome [23].
To clarify, the attacker is capable of achieving co-residency with
a victim, can allocate an arbitrary number of resources, and game
both the cloud level scheduler (placement), and the operating sys-
tem level scheduler (preemption). However, we assume that the
cloud infrastructure is trusted. That is, while the cloud scheduler
may be gamed, we assume that both the attacker and victim are
authenticated with the cloud provider (e.g., for billing purposes).
Additionally, we assume that the host kernel running either KVM
or containers is trusted.
It is important to note that there are many other threats to cloud
computing environments apart from cache-based side-channels.
We limit the scope of this work to addressing cache-based side
channels attacks. Such attacks can be launched by any legitimate
tenant without having to exploit any vulnerabilities and without
compromising the underlying software or hardware.
3 SYSTEM ARCHITECTURE
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Figure 2: System Overview
Our framework logically partitions a host server into an isolated
region4 and a shared region as illustrated in Figure 2. Tenants are
required to indicate to the cloud provider whether or not their
containers need isolated execution. Containers designated as re-
quiring isolated execution will be executed in the isolated partition
of the host server, while all other containers will be executed in
the shared partition. The ‘isolated execution’ designation guaran-
tees that processes within the designated containers will not share
cache resources with (i) processes from any container belonging to
another tenant (or security domain), or with (ii) processes belong-
ing to any container that is not designated for isolated execution
irrespective of their ownership (or security domain).
Our design, discussed next, leverages (i) Intel CAT, processor
a￿nities (or CPU pinning) and selective page sharing to provide
4It can be extended to multiple isolated regions.
spatial isolation, and (ii) co-scheduling with state cleansing to pro-
vide temporal isolation for designated containers.
3.1 Hardware Enforced Spatial Isolation
Intel’s CAT [17], currently available in COTS hardware in Intel’s
Xeon series processors, is designed to improve the performance
of latency sensitive real-time workloads by allowing the LLC to
be partitioned into distinct regions. Each processor core can be
restricted to allocating cache lines into a speci￿ed cache partition.
Consequently, a processor can only evict cache lines within the
processor’s assigned LLC partition, thus reducing the impact of
processes running on that processor core can have on other cache
regions and vice versa. In particular, note that the ability to allocate
cache lines (priming in prime+probe attacks) in a cache shared
with the victim, and the ability to evict cache lines being used
by the victim process (￿ushing in ￿ush-reload attacks) are key
steps in cache-based side channel attacks. Therefore ensuring that
a potential victim and attacker processes run on cores associated
with di￿erent LLC cache partitions, as we propose in our framework,
defeats some cache-side-channel attacks. Speci￿cally, cross-core
prime+probe attacks on a victim process using a di￿erent cache
partition are eliminated.
Accordingly, we partition the LLC into two regions using Intel
CAT and associate cores in the system to each partition such that
a core is assigned to one or the other partition but not both. We
refer to these partitions as isolated partition and shared partition.
Processes belonging to containers designated as needing isolated
execution will be pinned to the cores (using processor a￿nity)
associated with the isolated cache partition and the rest will be
pinned to cores associated with the shared cache partition. The
maximum number of cache partitions available with Intel CAT is a
hardware parameter and ￿xed for a given micro-architecture. The
machine used for our testing allows for up to 4 distinct partitions,
but newer machines have 16. But the con￿guration of size, number
of active partitions, and core to partition assignment can occur
in software and can be adjusted based on the demand for isolated
execution and the needs of the expected workloads. Further, if there
is no demand for shared execution then the host server could be
partitioned into two (or more) isolated partitions.
As previously discussed, this hardware-assisted spatial partition-
ing protects the containers running in the isolated partition against
cross-core prime+probe cache-side-channel attacks from containers
running in the shared partition. However, cross-core cache-side-
channel attacks across cache partitions are not entirely eliminated
because Intel CAT, primarily designed to improve fairness of cache
sharing and the performance of real-time workloads, allows cache
hits across partition boundaries to maximize the bene￿ts of shared
memory (e.g., shared libraries). In particular, if the victim and the
attacker processes have shared memory (e.g., because of layered
￿le systems used in container frameworks), an attacker can ￿ush
cache lines associated with the shared memory of interest from his
LLC partition, wait for a little while for the victim to execute, read
the same shared memory and measure the time taken to see if there
was a cache hit. Since the attacker previously ￿ushed the cache
line associated with the shared memory from his LLC partition,
a cache hit indicates that the victim executing in a di￿erent core
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(a) Union Filesystem Architecture
(b) Modi￿ed Union Filesystem Architecture
Figure 3: Defense against Shared-Memory Attacks
and LLC partition has used or is using the library. While this limits
the granularity of information an attacker can glean across parti-
tion boundaries, timing observations and hence the side-channel is
not entirely eliminated. Further, cache-side-channel attacks from
within an isolated partition continue to be viable. These will be
addressed in the following subsections.
However, even the partial protection against cache-side chan-
nel attacks obtained through this spatial partitioning comes at the
cost of reduced LLC cache size and the associated potential reduc-
tion in performance. Fortunately however, reduction in cache size
has been shown to have relatively little impact on modern cloud
workloads [12]. In particular, minimal performance sensitivity to
LLC size has been reported above cache sizes of 4   6MB for mod-
ern scale-out and traditional server workloads (see Section 4.3 and
Figure 4 in [12]) that are typical in cloud environments.
3.2 Selective Page Sharing
As previously discussed, hardware-assisted spatial partitioning does
not eliminate cross-core ￿ush-reload style cache-side channel at-
tacks when the attacker and the victim have shared memory pages.
Modern container deployments have one primary source of shared
memory. Since Docker is one of the most popular choices for build-
ing container images and running them on Linux platforms, we
limit our discussion to it, but these concepts are similar in other
container frameworks. Docker uses storage drivers that are built on
top of Union Filesystems (UFS) to present a ￿lesystem to a process
inside of a container from a stack of layers. Figure 3a shows how
di￿erent layers are stacked and shared across di￿erent containers.
Several di￿erent containers may use the same base components,
thus a way was needed to reduce disk and memory usage of the
common building blocks. Docker solves this problem by uniquely
identifying each layer by its cryptographic hash and sharing the
common ones between all containers built using a given layer ID.
Often there are multiple containers running the same image
which causes them to share all the layers except for the upper most
writable layer. For example, two Apache Tomcat servers running on
the same Docker installation using the same image would share all
the binaries including Java Virtual Machine (JVM), Apache Tomcat
binary, GnuPG binary, and OpenSSL binary among others. Only
the top most layer, containing writable elements such as Tomcat’s
log ￿le, di￿er between containers.
To thwart ￿ush-reload style attacks across cache partitions, we
eliminate cross-domain page sharing through selective layer dupli-
cation. That is, for containers designated for isolated execution, our
system allows sharing of layers only among containers belonging
to the same tenant (or security domain) but not otherwise (see
Figure 12b). This is a reasonable trade-o￿ as it enables isolation
between di￿erent tenants (or security domains) while limiting the
increase in memory usage. In particular, the increase in memory
usage will be a function of the number of tenants running on the
server rather than the number of containers. We do not prevent
traditional sharing of layers for containers running in the shared
partition.
For VMs, kernel same-page merging (KSM) module in Linux
used for memory deduplication is the main source of shared pages.
However, KSM and memory de-duplication in general come with
their own security risks(e.g., [2, 3, 29, 33]). For instance it has been
shown that KSM can be leveraged to break ASLR [2], can enable
Rowhammer [20] attacks across VMs [29], and create a timing
side-channel that can be used to detect the existence of software
across VMs [33] much like the ￿ush-reload style attack discussed
previously. Given the serious security concerns surrounding the
use of KSM we disable it in our framework.
Note, that selective page sharing combinedwith hardware-assisted
spatial partitioning eliminate cross-core cache-side-channel attacks
across partitions. Cache-side-channel attacks from within an iso-
lated partition continue to be a threat and will be discussed next.
3.3 State Cleansing
Even with containers running in an isolated partition, an attacker
allocated to the same isolated partition as the victimmight be able to
(i) observe the victim’s LLC usage if scheduled to run on a di￿erent
core than the victim but associated with the same partition, and (ii)
even observe the victim’s L1 and L2 usage if running on the same
core as the victim (e.g., [47]). In the latter case an attacker observes
the cache usage of the victim by managing to frequently alternate
execution with the victim process.
To thwart the latter kind of attacks we propose to cleanse the
cache state when context switching between processes (containers)
belonging to di￿erent tenants (or security domains). That is, if a
process from one security domain (tenant), SD1, runs on a core,
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then a processes belonging to another domain, SD2, must either run
on a core assigned to a separate partition or state-cleansing must be
performed on the partition during the transition between process
from SD1 to process from SD2. There currently exists no hardware
instruction for per-partition cache invalidation.More details on how
state cleansing is achieved are in Section 4. However, this does not
prevent attacks from an attacker process who is running in parallel
with the victim either on the same-core through simultaneousmulti-
threading or hyper-threading, or running on a di￿erent core but in
the same partition.
A naïve solution would be to assign just one core to the isolated
partition, disable hyper-threading and perform state-cleansing on
every context-switch. The performance cost of such an approach
is unattractive. A mitigation would be to create multiple isolated
partitions with a single-core assigned to each. However, the number
of cache partitions is ￿nite (4 in our case), and such a an approach
would further fragment the LLC for the shared partition. Further,
many cloud workloads are multi-threaded.
3.4 Co-scheduling for Temporal Isolation
To address the aforementioned threat, we use a novel scheduling
technique for temporal separation of security domains sharing a
single cache partition. Co-scheduling container processes belonging
to a given security domain across multiple processors amortizes
the cost of state cleansing, but introduces additional complexity
which we address below.
Scale-out workloads with many threads, those commonly de-
ployed on cloud infrastructure, motivate this approach. As thread
counts for a security domain increase, the number of threads able
to run per domain at any given time remains high. This allows us to
drive up utilization of cores assigned to a partition and only ￿ush
the partition when changing to the next domain. The complexities
stem from needing to synchronize all isolated cores during domain
changes, thus any implementation of co-scheduling has to guaran-
tee an exclusion property. No task belonging to security domain
SDX can run on an isolated processor while a task from another
domain, SDY , is running in a processor associated with the same
isolated partition. Additionally, before a task from SDX can run, a
state cleansing event must occur. As shown in Figure 4, multiple
cores can be utilized at once within a security domain, but then
state-cleansing must be performed as every core assigned to a given
partition context switches to another security domain. The next
security domain cannot run on any isolated processor until this
process is complete.
4 IMPLEMENTATION
Partitioning the LLC and associating cores with each partition does
not need changes to the kernel or the operating system. It can be
done by a system administrator as part of themachine con￿guration.
Here we focus on the implementation of rest of the components.
4.1 Co-Scheduling
Co-scheduling can enforce isolation between security domains, but
any implementation must be precise. By precise, we mean that any
form of “loose" or “lazy" co-scheduling is unacceptable. For example,
Isolated
Core 0 Core 1 Core 3Core 2 Core 4 Core 5 Core 7Core 6 Core 8 Core 9
SD0 SD0 SD0 SD0
SD1 SD1 SD1 SD1
SD2 SD2 SD2 SD2
State Cleansing Event
State Cleansing Event
ti
me
= Schedulable UnitSD = Security Domain
Figure 4: Co-scheduling Overview - The isolated environ-
ment is on the left. It consist of an isolated cache parti-
tion along with the processors assigned to that partition. Co-
scheduling is used to group tasks belonging to the same secu-
rity domain and state cleasing events occur when changing
domains. Regular tasks are on the right in a separate cache
partition. Tasks on the right have no scheduling restrictions.
consider a naïve implementation of co-scheduling as outlined in
Figure 5.
Table 1: Per Security Domain Thread Allocations
Security Domain Thread Count
ORG1 2
ORG2 3
Figure 5 is a schedule instance of the con￿guration as described
in Table 1. The example is a situation in which 2 cores are associated
with an isolated partition and are running containers belonging to
two security domains. These cores may be two physical cores or
one physical core presented as two to the operating system (SMT).
The de￿ning characteristic in our example is the shared cache. For
hypthreaded cores, this is the L1, L2, and LLC. In the case of two
physical cores, the shared cache is only the LLC. The cores 1 and 2
in our example are not cores on two separate sockets on the same
motherboard.
Consider a situation in which Core1 initiates a domain transfer
upon scheduling a thread from a con￿icting domain, ORG2:THREAD1
in this example. Even if the scheduler invokes a ￿ushing event,
f1, there remains a  t3 during which cross-core, cross-domain
attacks could be carried out. This is seen again afterCore1 schedules
ORG1:THREAD1 and ORG2:THREAD3 leading to durations  t4 and  t5
during which attacks remain feasible. While this situation is still
better than the behavior of the default scheduler, it is not guaranteed
to eliminate observable cache interference.
Cache	Partition
Protected	Region
CORES
Core	1
Core	2
ORG1:	Thread1 ORG2:	Thread1
Scheduling	Policy
ORG1:	Thread2 ORG2:	Thread2
ORG1:	Thread1
ORG1:	Thread2
ORG2:	Thread3
ORG2:	Thread1
t
f1 f2 f3
Δ t3 Δ t4 Δ t5
Figure 5: Limitations of Naïve Co-Scheduling
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This example highlights the need for careful attention to de-
tails when implementing co-scheduling for improved security on
modern operating systems. E￿ective elimination of side-channels
dictates that cross-core synchronization be performed before state
cleansing occurs and subsequent domain scheduling takes place.
To ensure that no two schedulable units belonging to di￿erent
security domains run on an isolated cache partition simultaneously,
we implement the core synchronization protocol shown in Figure
6. The protocol works by making the ￿rst core in an isolated par-
tition a leader core. The leader core is responsible for initiating
domain changes, synchronizing cores, and ￿ushing the cache (state
cleansing). All isolated cores only schedule tasks belonging to the
ACTIVE_SECURITY_DOMAIN. Note that while only 2 cores are shown
in Figure 6, the approach works with any number of cores. In Sec-
tion 5 we evaluate the protocol with 4 cores assigned to an isolated
partition.
ORG1: Thread1 ORG1: Thread2
TRUSTED PROC
Initiate SD Change
Flush Cache
Force Reschedule
Change SD
TRUSTED PROC
ORG2: Thread1 ORG2: Thread2
Leader Follower
ROUND_OVER = True
ROUND_OVER = False
Figure 6: Strict Co-Scheduling Protocol
Isolated cores rely on two pieces of shared state to achieve strict
synchronization. The leader core is the only core that can modify
the state. The ROUND_OVER variable indicates to follower cores that
a domain change is about to occur. A timer on the leader core
initiates a domain change by modifying this variable and invoking
the __schedule function on the leader core. The change domain
event ￿res every sysctl_sched_min_granularity. After setting
the ROUND_OVER variable to true, the leader core issues a reschedule
command to follower cores and waits for them to send back an
acknowledgment. The acknowledgment is performed within the
__schedule function on follower cores. When the ROUND_OVER
variable is set, partitioned cores can only run trusted processes.
These are only kernel tasks, including: ksoftirq, watchdog, and
the idle task.
After receiving an acknowledgment back from all follower cores,
the leader then ￿ushes the cache and updates the ACTIVE_SECURITY_-
DOMAIN to point to the next security domain. Our system uses a
separate task_group within the Linux kernel for each security do-
main. All task_groups at the same level are linked together using
a linked list. We use this list to implement a round robin style it-
eration through security domains on the leader core. Run-queue
checking is performed to ensure a domain with runnable tasks is
chosen.
Having chosen the next domain, the leader core sets ROUND_-
OVER to false and again issues a reschedule command to follower
cores. The __schedule function will eventually be invoked on the
follower cores, but we use the reschedule command to reduce the
idle time of follower cores. This protocol corrects the problem
presented in Figure 5 resulting in “strict" co-scheduling as seen in
Figure 7.
Cache	Partition
Protected	Region
CORES
Core	1
Core	2
ORG1:	Thread1 ORG2:	Thread1
Scheduling	Policy
ORG1:	Thread2 ORG2:	Thread2
ORG1:	Thread1
ORG1:	Thread2
ORG2:	Thread3
ORG2:	Thread1
t
f1 f2 f3
Figure 7: Synchronized Co-Scheduling
4.2 State Cleansing
The isolated cache partition must be cleaned or ￿ushed before
switching context to a di￿erent security domain. For a processor
cache, state cleansing or ￿ushing equates to invalidating the cache
lines or evicting them, but no hardware mechanism exists to ￿ush
the cache lines assigned to a single CAT partition. The WBINVD
instruction invalidates the entire shared cache disrupting processes
in all partitions.
One way to implement state cleansing is for the user process
to invoke the CLFLUSH instruction, which can evict cache lines
corresponding to a linear virtual address and can be invoked from
user space. This can be done by the application process before being
switched out as was done in [50]. However, this requires changes to
user applications which is not desirable. Another possibility is for
the kernel to invoke CLFLUSH on the entire virtual address space.
While this is guaranteed to work across processor generations, this
approach is too costly. An optimization is to do it only on valid
virtual addresses for the task being switched out as was done in [42].
However, this can still be a large range compared to the size of a
cache partition (4   6MB).
Another approach is to create an eviction set – a set of addresses
which when loaded are guaranteed to evict the entire cache par-
tition. However, the memory address to cache line mapping is
proprietary and subject to change across processor generations.
Cache-side-channel attacks also have to contend with this challenge
and have addressed it by reverse-engineering the memory address
to cache line mapping for a given micro-architecture (e.g., [23]).
Apart from the one-time of cost of reverse engineering, the cost of
this approach is equal to loading memory the size of cache partition.
We adopt this approach.
We perform this state cleansing anytime the security domain is
changed, as shown by the protocol in Figure 6 and the co-scheduling
overview in Figure 4. To reduce performance impact in the case of
other domains lacking runnable threads (due to blocking on I/O,
etc. ), ￿ushing is only performed when ACTIVE_SECURITY_DOMAIN
changes.
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4.3 Selective Page Sharing
Docker uses Union File systems(UFS) to present a uni￿ed view of the
several di￿erent layers. Of the several UFS that Docker supports like
btrfs[9], overlayfs[10], AUFS[8], AUFS is one of the most mature
one. In a UFS, multiple directories on the host are uni￿ed in a
single directory called union mount, without replicating the actual
contents of individual directories. Contents (￿les or directories) of
all the directories become visible at union mount. Docker keeps
single copy of each layer on the host ￿lesystem and AUFS mounts
all the layers to a single union mount point, which is then handed
over to the container as its root ￿le system. Each layer could be
a part of multiple union mounts and thus can be shared across
di￿erent containers.An important point to note here is that this
behavior is speci￿c to AUFS and Docker.
Our implementation modi￿es Docker (v1.14.0-dev, compiled
from source code available on Github), speci￿cally the AUFS stor-
age driver, to transparently allow selective sharing of ￿le system
layers. Docker’s command line client provides an option called
--cgroup-parent which sets the parent cgroup of the container to
the value provided. We modi￿ed the AUFS driver to have separate
copies of each layer for each cgroup-parent. Each cgroup-parent
maps to a separate security domain and thus no two containers
belonging to di￿erent security domains have any common layers
between them.
5 PERFORMANCE EVALUATION
5.1 Impact of Scheduler Changes
Feasibility is evaluated using a CPU bound workload to determine
the impact on applications in the worst case scenario. Consider a
batch workload such as Hadoop or a web serving workload. The
case in which all threads have work and are not waiting for input
is evaluated here.
The machine is con￿gured as outlined in Section 2. We allocate 2
physical cores and 4 logical processors to an isolated cache region.
The cores IDs are 4,20,5, and 21 due to the way Linux numbers
logical processors. The cache region is 4MB (4 cache ways out of
20 available on the system). Each security domain is assigned 4
threads, and the number of domains is varied from 2 to 8. Each
domain consists of 4 cpu bound tasks, 1 for each logical processor.
Measurements are taken using sar and pidstat at an interval of
once per second for 100 seconds. Figures 9-11 showwhere processor
time is spent under di￿erent scheduler con￿gurations. It is clear to
see that the overheads for a single logical processor are a function
of the system and not of the number of security domains assigned to
a partition. . Follower cores in (b) and (c) can be seen idling during
domain changes, but the overheads never exceed slightly above
10%, with the average case being slightly below 10% on follower
processors. Flushing signi￿cantly increases the performance penal-
ties as can been seen by the di￿erences in (c) and (b) in each of the
￿gures. The leader core spends the most time executing in system
space due to its responsibility to change domains and synchronize
cores, so this was to be expected. In the future, we will investigate
mechanisms to reduce system time on the leader core and idle time
on follower cores. Figure 8b shows the overhead normalized to
security domain (each domain representing an organization with
(a) Baseline
(b) Co-Scheduling, Flushing
Figure 8: Overheads Per Domain
names testing[1-4] in this case) for the 4 security domain case. The
reduction in time spent in userspace per domain is small.
5.2 Impact of Shared Memory Reduction
By enabling selective sharing of base layers in Docker, we expect
an increase in the memory footprint of containers as there are
multiple copies of certain pages that would otherwise be shared. To
understand the memory growth vs. the number of security domains,
we ran 2 experiments each with a web server (Apache Tomcat)
and an in-memory database (Redis). We used smem to measure the
proportional set size (PSS) per container as it represents realistic
memory usage by only adding the fair share of the total shared
memory. To make sure that the code is resident in memory before
we take measurements, we sent 100 requests each to the Apache
Tomcat servers and added 1000 random key-value pairs to each
Redis server. We designed our experiments to be representative of
real world deployments ofmicro-services wheremultiple containers
each of a single type run in a distributed fashion.
In the ￿rst experiment we measured how the average memory
usage of each container increased as we increased the number
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(a) Baseline (b) Co-Scheduling (c) Co-Scheduling with Flushing
Figure 9: 2 Security Domains, 4 Logical Processors in Isolated Partition - Per Core Utilization
(a) Baseline (b) Co-Scheduling (c) Co-Scheduling with Flushing
Figure 10: 4 Security Domains, 4 Logical Processors in Isolated Partition - Per Core Utilization
(a) Baseline (b) Co-Scheduling (c) Co-Scheduling with Flushing
Figure 11: 8 Security Domains, 4 Logical Processors in Isolated Partition - Per Core Utilization
of security domains from 1 to 4. Each security domain owns 5
containers. It was compared against the same number of containers
running without modi￿cations on Docker (i.e., all the containers
share base layers). We measure the average memory usage for
across 50 runs. Figure 12a and 12b show that memory usage for
Redis increased only about 0.45 MB per container and for Apache
Tomcat only about 1.71 MB.
In the second experiment we ran 20 containers equally split
between 1, 2 and 4 security domains and observed the increase of
memory usage per container. Figure 12c and 12d show that memory
usage for Redis increased only about 1.61 MB per container and for
Apache tomcat 3.26 MB.
The results support our claim that the additional cost of selective
sharing of memory is negligible. The increase that we see arises
from the duplicate copies ofmemory pages, one per security domain,
which were shared among all the containers within that domain.
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(a) Unmodi￿ed vs. Modi￿ed (Redis) (b) Unmodi￿ed vs. Modi￿ed (Tomcat)
(c) Memory Usage vs. No. of Security Domains (Redis) (d) Memory Usage vs. No. of Security Domains (Tomcat)
Figure 12: Memory Overheads
6 RELATEDWORKS
6.1 Cache Side-Channels
Cache side-channel attacks take advantage of the shared nature of
processor resources, in particular the processor’s Level-1, Level-2,
and Last-Level caches. Prime+Probe attacks were ￿rst explored
across Virtual Machines (VMs) by Osvik et al. [27] and shown to
be practical in cross-core attacks via the LLC by Liu et al. [23].
Modern clouds are driving up machine utilization by o￿ering con-
tainer based platforms. This increases revenue [36] while provid-
ing more performance to tenants [11, 41]. Cache side-channel at-
tacks are already emerging on container based infrastructure [48].
Flush+Reload attacks [18] are a real threat to cloud computing se-
curity and have been successfully deployed on public infrastructure
[48]. All of these attacks fall under the broader class of access based
side-channels in which an attacker can tell whether or not a given
resource has been accessed by a victim in a given time period.
6.2 Existing Solutions
Existing approaches achieve single core isolation by disabling hy-
perthreading. StealthMem is able to enable hyperthreading, but the
authors do not su￿ciently address cross thread scheduling issues
[19] and it requires application developers to make code changes.
Disabling hyperthreading signi￿cantly reduces the throughput of
not only the “secure" workload, but the entire machine. Disabling
hypthreading is untenable as the economicmodel behind cloud com-
puting dictates high per machine utilization [36]. Cutting whole-
machine utilization by even 20% (the impact of hyperthreading in
2005 [4]) is too high for cloud computing. We argue that for some
tenants, a 20% overhead may be a reasonable trade-o￿ for increased
security, there is little value in forcing all tenants pay that perfor-
mance penalty. CATalyst [22] follows a similar defense model to
Stealthmem but uses Intel’s CAT technology to assign virtual pages
to sensitive variables instead of software-based page coloring.
CACHEBAR [51] defends against Flush+Reload attacks by dupli-
cating memory pages on access from separate processes, a scheme
it calls Copy-On-Read. Since Linux’ KSM does de-duplication of
pages at regular intervals, it also modi￿es the behavior of KSM to
achieve Copy-On-Read. To defend against Prime & Probe attack
CACHEBAR modi￿es the memory allocation based on which cache
lines the memory regions maps to so that the attacking process
loses visibility into the victim process. It provides only probabilistic
guarantees for defense against a Prime & Probe attack.
Some solutions are probabilistic [25, 37, 51] or do not protect ap-
plications when SMT is enabled [51]. Others require developers to
re-write applications [19, 22, 31] or rely on costly hardware changes
[39, 40]. Other hardware approaches violate x86 semantics by mod-
ifying the resolution, accuracy or availability of timing instruc-
tions [21, 24, 38] . Finally, cache coloring [28, 32, 45] approaches
have impractically high overheads. Solutions like Nomad[25], while
probabilistic, complement our approach. Nomad works in the cloud
scheduler to reduce the co-residency of di￿erent security domains.
Our solution could be used in conjunction with Nomad to provide
hard isolation when co-residency restrictions are not possible.
7 CONCLUSIONS
We have presented a hardware/software mechanism that eliminates
cache based side-channels for schedulable units belonging to sepa-
rate security domains. Unlike many existing solutions, our solution
allows SMT to remain enabled and does not require application
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level changes. A user simply noti￿es the provider that a given work-
load should be run in isolation. Our solution eliminates an attackers
ability to use the cache as a noisy communication channels and
does not rely on probabilistic methods to decrease the granular-
ity of information available on the channel. We implemented our
system on top of the Linux scheduler and presented an evaluation
of the system under a CPU bound workload. Our system has a
worst case reduction in utilization in the case of 2 security domains
of 9.8% and only 2.97% and 1.68% decrease in utilization for the 4
and 8 security domain con￿gurations respectively (with 4 logical
processors assigned to an isolated partition).
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